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Abstract 
With the diversification of both water utility investment and property right structure, it is necessary to establish a 
scientific compensation mechanism of water conservancy benefit to balance the interests among investors, water 
users and pertinent sectors which suffer loss. This paper analyzes the compensation policies water management 
authority imposed on water supply enterprises under uncertain demand, establishes a compensation model with 
risk preference, explains the implications of risk preference on the decision-making behaviors of water supply 
enterprises by using numerical analysis method, provides the basis for the water management department to 
formulate reasonable water resources charge standards and compensation policies. At last, the paper discusses 
how to implement the water compensation policies according to the characteristics of rural water utilities. 
Key words:  water  use  uncertainty,  risk  preference,  expected  revenue,  compensation  policy,  compensation 
standard. 
 
I.  Introduction 
Water utility investment and operation are faced with some uncertain factors: first, the grain production 
may be unstable owing to the climatic variables; second, natural disasters affect rural water supply and demand; 
third,  national  adjustments  of  agricultural  policies  impact  on  the  agricultural  water  demand;  besides,  the 
imposition  of  water  fee  and  investment  returns  are  influenced  by  farmers’  payment  capacity  and  their 
insufficient  commodity  awareness  of  water. All  these  risk  factors  render  water  utiliuty  service  exceedingly 
uncertain  and  thus  affect  water  utility  revenue.  In  addition,  given  that  water  project  assumes  some  public 
functions such as flood prevention, environmental improvement, irrigation and so on, it’s difficult to calculate 
and  quantify  its  public  welfare  consumption  in  the  contract.  If  the  interest  compensation  mechanism  is 
unreasonable,  the  operating  efficiency  of  these  projects  invested  by  the  state  will  be  impaired  because  of 
managerical  dereliction  as  well  as  overdue  and  ineffective  compensation.  Similarly,  in  terms  of  the  water 
programs patronized by the society, the unreasonable investment compensation mechanism is hard to kindle the 
investors’ enthusiasm or to protect the ecological environment in the vicinity of the projects, and thus will 
undermine the interests of related groups. Therefore, in light of both the uncertainty of water utility revenue and 
the principle of efficiency and fairness, there is a crying need to establish a compensation mechanism according 
to the actual cost and proceeds incured by  water engineering maintenance. 
Against this background, many scholars have made valuable studies on water compensation problems 
from  different  perspectives.  Zhang  Xiuju  and  Dong  Wenhu,  for  instance,  who  analyzed  the  status  of 
consumptive compensation and its pattern in the public water project, contend that the compensation scope and 
standard should be defined on the basis of delimiting the boundaries between business assets and the public 
ones
[1]-[2]; Shao Wenyan probed into the necessity and measures to carry out water utility compensation
[3]; Wang 
Yuanjing explored patterns about benefit compensation and benefit sharing
[4]; Zhang Shaoqing considered that, 
in order to ensure the  normal operation and  maintenance of  water utility  facilities, various costs of public 
consumptive compensation in the water utility should be reasonably calculated
[5]; the Soft Science Research 
Group of Agriculture Ministry thinks that the implementation of direct subsidies for farmers is conducive to 
fairness and efficiency
[6]; Zhu Dongkai, Duan Yuefang studied on the immigrant compensation system of water 
utility and hydropower engineering
[7]-[8]; Sun Qingyu deems that the essence of rural water compensation is to 
ascertain compensation object and compensation standard, namely, a reasonable upper limit of compensation 
should be based on the structure of revenue sharing, while the lower one on the construction costs and operating 
costs
[9]; He Xuefeng analyzed the income of stakeholders of rural farmland water projects
  [10]. Christopher A 
propounded the franchise contract with flexible term and devised a two-dimensional bidding mechanism
[11]. 
Pertinent documentations have already detailed the compensation of consumption induced by the project itself, 
however, the research on the stakeholders’ benefit compensation mechanism, especially on how to establish 
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compensatory policies in face of uncertain revenue, is by no means deep and exhaustive. Besides, compensation 
mechanisms for the social funds’ non-profit consumption in the water project constructions are not impeccable, 
which exactly affect the sustainable development of rural water utility and become bottlenecks of rural water 
project development. Given those foregoing perceptions, this paper introduces the risk preferences of water 
management  authority  and  water  supply  enterprise  to  compensatory  strategies,  establishes  the  water 
management unit’s and water supply enterprises’ strategy models of compensation with risk preferences, and 
explicitly  expounds  the  compensatory  policies  under  incertitude  demand.  According  to  China’s  national 
conditions, it also specifically analyze how to implement the compensatory policies for Chinese water supply 
enterprises. 
 
II.  Glossaries and Terms 
For the sake of convenience, the symbols are defined as follows:  () x  is a probability density function 
for water demand,  () x  is a distribution function for water demand,  rg is a risk preference parameter of water 
management authority,  rw is a risk preference parameter of water supply enterprise,  g C is the cost of water 
resource,  w C is the actual fee charged by water management department, p is the selling price of water,  0 Q is 
the planned water production to meet consumption, b is the compensatory price that government provides to 
water supply enterprise,  l c is the loss of water enterprise incured by water shortage, x is a random demand when 
the supply water price is p,  g B and  g U stand for the actual earnings and expected revenue of water management 
department  respectively,  while B  w  and  U  w  are  the  actual  proceeds  and  expected  revenue  of  water  supply 
enterprise respectively. Water management department’s expected revenue is  ( ) ( ) U E B r Var B g g g g  , 
the water supply enterprise’s expected revenue is  ( ) ( ) U E B r Var B w w w w  . 
 
III. Water Compensatory Policy Model 
Suppose that both water resource price and governmental compensatory price are given by the water 
management department, when the water demand is x, 
For water management department, water cost is         0 gg C c Q                                                                     (1) 
The actual charge collected by water department is       0 wp C w Q                                                                     (2) 
The compensation for water supply enterprise provided by water management authorities brings additional 
cost to water authorities themselves, so the actual earnings of water management department is: 
0 ( ) min( , ) g w g b p g B C C R w c b Q b x Q                                                                                               (3) 
The actual turnover of water supply enterprise is        *min( , ) R P x Q                                                             (4) 
The compensation government provides to water enterprise is  
00 *[ min( , )] b R b Q x Q                                                                                                                                    (5) 
Since water demand is determined by the market, when the planned water supply of enterprise is less 
than the users’ demand, there will be loss caused by water shortage, and the loss of water enterprise is  
0 [ min( , )] ll C c x x Q                                                                                                                                     (6) 
The management cost of water supply enterprise is    00 [ min( , )] mm C c Q x Q                                                (7) 
According to above formulas, when the water demand is x, the actual earnings of water enterprise is 
w b w l m B R R C C C      = 0 ( )min( , ) ( ) m l p m l p c b c x Q w c b Q c x                                          (8) 
Given the above questions, Leader Follower Game can be used to investigate the interactions between 
water management authorities and water supply enterprise. Water management authority serving as a guidance-
providing regulator, specifies the price of water resource and the policy standard of compensation, according to 
which,  while  the  water  supply  enterprise,  as  an  object  to  be  regulated,  determines  its  water  use  plan.  The 
assumption that water management sector will eventually establish the optimal water price and compensatory 
price on the basis of the reaction function is warranted and universal, because, compared to the water enterprise, 
water authority has a macroscopical advantage to guide the market. At the same time, because the water market 
is open, the information about the price in water market, distribution of demand and water cost parameters is 
symmetrical. As a managerial body of this trade, water authority has all the necessary information to analyze the Shou-Kui He et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                      www.ijera.com 
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reaction function of planned output, which water enterprises expect on the basis of water resource price and 
compensatory policy, and to make the best decisions. This paper supposes that the water authority and water 
supply enterprise are absolutely rational, that is they are self-interested and both of them make decisions, before 
the  actual  water  demand  is  observed,  on  the  principle  of  maximizing  the  expected  revenue  despite  their 
divergent social welfare objectives. 
Suppose that the water demand is in normal distribution,   is the average of distribution function, and standard 
deviation  is   .  Let 
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2 ( ), ( ) E x E x of  water  demand  x and 
2 x   respectively,  their 
expressions are 
( ) [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] E x a b a b                                                                                                                  (9) 
2 2 2 2 2 ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )] (2 ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) E x a b a a b b                                                                (10) 
On the basis of them, let  min( , ) xQ  , we can get the averages of 
2 ,  respectively: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /2 [ ( ) ( )] E a Q b Q a b                                                                                             (11) 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) /2 (2 ) ( ) (2 ) ( ) E F a Q b Q a a b b                                (12) 
The internal relationship between the expected return and the actual return has been defined in the 
former  part,  and  the  expected  revenues  of  water  authority  and  water  enterprise  have  been  analyzed  in  the 
theoretical model, in accordance with the intrinsic relationships between those definitions, we can convert the 
actual revenue to the expected revenue with preference. According to the above formulas, the expected revenue 
of water authority is 
( ) ( ) g g g g U E B rVar B  =() w c b Q pg  +
2 ( ) ( ) m bE r b Var                                                            (13) 
The expected revenue of water enterprise is 
( ) ( ) w w w w U E B rVar B  =( ) ( ) ml p c b c E     ( ) ( ) p m l w c b Q c E       
22 ( ) ( ) ( ) m m l m l r p c b c Var r c Var                                                                                                           (14) 
Comparing the expected revenue functions with preference of water authority and water enterprise, we 
find  that  the  expected  revenue  function  for  water  enterprise  is  more  complex. According  to  the  foregoing 
analysis, firstly, we must determine the reaction function for water enterprise, and then establish a balanced 
reaction function of water enterprise by following the principle of maximizing the expected revenue in this 
paper. 
On  the  basis  of  the  above  assumptions  and  definitions,  we  can  obtain  the  reaction  function  whi ch 
includes the variables of the amount of water that the water enterprise plans to supply, water price, government 
compensatory standard, the cost parameter and demand distribution parameter, namely: 
[() ml p c b c    -2 w r
2 () ml p c b c    ][ ( )] QE  [1- ( )] 2( ) pm b w c b          (15) 
This result describes the internal balanced relationship among the water enterprise’s water supply plan
Q , water price P w and governmental compensatory standardb. Through the balanced reaction function of water 
enterprise, water authority gains the balanced water resource price and compensatory standard in accordance 
with the principle of maximizing the water authority’s expected revenue. 
 
IV. Analysis of Compensatory Policy 
Given  the  fact  that  the  balanced  reaction  function  of  water  enterprise  is  complex  and  there  is  no 
obvious function expression and solution, the balanced solutions are discussed by using the methods of static 
analysis and numerical analysis in order to perform a specific study of the theoretical model’s results. Assume 
that the water authority’s water cost and sewage treatment cost is  2.0 g c  , compared to the production cost, 
the loss of water shortage and overproduction of water enterprise can be negligible, thus,  0 ml cc  , water 
price 4.0 p  , water demand average 200   , demand standard deviation is  3050   , , the risk preference 
of water authority and water enterprise are respectively  0,1 0,1 wm rr  and  . 
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price, equilibriums of water authority’s and water enterprise’s expected revenues are obtained as follows: 
(1)  When the water authority is risk-neutral, the standard deviation of water demand is 30, 
 if the water enterprise is risk-neutral,  0 3.96 , 3.98 200, 1.85, 176.1 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， ;  
if the water enterprise is risk-averse,  0 3.97 , 3.98 200, 1.73, 176.2 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， . 
(2)  When the water authority is risk-neutral, the standard deviation of water demand is 50,  
if the water enterprise is risk-neutral,  0 3.94 , 3.98 200, 1.62, 156.6 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， ;  
if the water enterprise is risk-averse,  0 3.97 , 3.98 200, 1.63, 156.7 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， . 
(3) When the water authority is risk-averse, the standard deviation of water demand is 30, if the water enterprise 
is risk-neutral,  0 0.98 , 3.94 152.6, 10.3, 136.2 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， . 
if the water enterprise is risk-averse,  0 3.66 , 1.98 141.2, 1.32, 131.2 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan，  
(4) When the water authority is risk-averse, the standard deviation of water demand is 50, if the water enterprise 
is risk-neutral,  0 0.36 , 3.71 133.4, 18.1, 112.6 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， ; 
if the water enterprise is risk-averse,  0 3.46 , 3.92 95.3, 2.02, 76.3 p g m b w Q B B      yuan yuan， . 
Form results (1) and (2): when the water authority is risk-neutral and the standard deviation for water 
demand is low,  whether the  water enterprise  has risk preference or not,  the  experimental solution of  water 
authority’s charging standard is 3.98 yuan, but when the standard deviation of water demand is high, water 
authority’s charging standard will be close to the water supply price. Comparing standard charges of the water 
authority and those of the water enterprise which have different risk preference, we can find that the charging 
standard provided by the risk-aversion water authority is lower than that provided by the water authority that is 
risk-neutral.  But  comparing  the  balanced  charging  standards  followed  by  the  water  authority  and  water 
enterprise which have different risk preferences, we discover that the balanced charging standard provided by 
the water authority to the water enterprise who is risk-averse is higher than that to the risk-neutral enterprise. It 
is  the  degree  of  risk  preference  that  mainly  causes  that  effect.  Because  the  risk-aversion  water  authority 
begrudges gamble, it wins the market with a conservative approach of low charging standard. However, for the 
water enterprises of risk aversion, water authority attracts them to confront the market bravely by providing an 
incentive method of high wholesale price. 
The balanced data above reflects that the compensatory price  b provided to water enterprise is lower 
than the charging standard of water authority p w , which is reasonable. If the water authority is risk-neutral, no 
matter  what  the  water  enterprise’s  risk  preference  is,  the  compensatory  price  increases  with  the  increasing 
standard  deviation  of  water  demand.  When  the  standard  deviation  of  water  demand  increases,  the  water 
authority  replenish  the  market  risk  of  water  enterprise  by  raising  the  compensatory  price. When  the  water 
authority  is  risk-averse,  the  compensatory  price  decreases  with  the  increasing  standard  deviation  of  water 
demand, which reflects that if the water market risk increases, the ability of water authority and water enterprise 
to  control  the  market  starts  to  weaken,  and  the  attitude  of  the  risk-aversion  water  authority  to  shun  risks 
generates one inevitable result: reducing the compensatory price is the only way to transfer risks. Horizontal 
comparison of the water enterprises’ balanced compensatory prices with different risk preferences shows that the 
compensatory price provided to risk-averse water enterprise by the water authority is relatively high, the reason 
for this conclusion is the same as the previous one. 
The  analysis  results  show  that  if  the  water  enterprise  is  risk-averse,  the  balanced  water  plan  for 
enterprise decreases with the increase of demand distribution parameter σ. The water enterprise, who disgusts 
market risk and hopes to reduce the instability caused by it, must calibrate the water price and compensatory 
standard in order to reduce its water supply plan, which is a normal response of water enterprise. Compared 
transversely, the balanced supply plan of the risk-averse water enterprise is lower, as a consequence of the 
negative attitude of water authority and water enterprise to the market risk. 
The  conclusion  is  that  there  is  a  reversely  dynamic  relationship  among  the  expected  revenue,  demand 
distribution parameter σ and risk preference of water authority, but the development trend of water enterprise’s 
expected revenue is more complicated. When the water authority is risk-neutral, whether the water enterprise is 
risk-neutral  or  risk-averse,  the  water  enterprise’s  expected  revenue  decreases  with  the  increasing  standard 
deviation of water demand σ; but if the water authority is risk-averse, whether the water enterprise is risk-
neutral or risk-averse, the water enterprise’s expected revenue increases with the increasing σ. 
 
V.  Application of Water Compensatory Policies 
Due  to  the  fact  that  water  enterprises  mostly  are  owned  by  the  state  and  the  market  competition 
mechanism is not fully established, risk compensatory policies are largely affected by non-economic factors and Shou-Kui He et al Int. Journal of Engineering Research and Applications                      www.ijera.com 
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personal preference behaviors. Because of these problems, the application of compensatory policies in the water 
industry  has  some  resistance.  In  terms  of  various  risks  in  water  supply  management,  to  implement  the 
compensatory  policies,  we  should  take  different  precautionary  measures  according  to  the  causes  and 
characteristics  of  risk,  such  as  enhancing  the  transparency  and  sharing  of  information,  optimizing  contract 
models, establishing the cost supervision mechanism of water enterprises, adopting the flexible designs and so 
on. 
The managerical objective of water industry is to pursue maximum social welfare, however, due to 
people’s different risk preferences, the utility values of the same risk return and its social welfare levels are 
different. Therefore, it is the risk preference of the water enterprise regulated by water authority that determines 
who to assume the risk within the water industry. 
1)  The  information  between  the  water  authority  and  water  enterprises  is  asymmetrical,  namely  the  water 
authority  can  only  observe  the  water  enterprises’  sale  performances,  but  fail  to  note  the  degree  of  water 
enterprise’s effort. According to the relevant incentive theory 
[12], when the water enterprise is risk-neutral, 
though the effort is not observable, the optimal effort can still be implemented by providing water enterprise 
some incentive mechanisms like compensation policy, which means that social Pareto Optimality in the water 
supply industry can still be achieved. 
But if the water enterprise is risk-averse, the inefficiencies of water conservancy investment is revealed 
by the moral hazard, at this moment, the compensation policy will become dysfunctional. In this case, sharing 
risks  jointly  by  sigining  agreements  on  profits  partaking  is  proved  to  be  the  most  effective  cooperational 
mechanism. 
2) When the water authority has the entire information about the water enterprise’s effort level, if the water 
authority is risk-neutral, and the water enterprise is risk-averse, the water authority can provide a higher water 
price and compensatory price to water enterprise to reduce the risks of water enterprise, ensure that the water 
enterprise has a relatively stable income, and make the water authority to enjoy more residual claim and assume 
most of the risks. If the water enterprise does not reach the required effort level, the water authority can mete out 
some penalities. As a result, under the condition of Pareto Optimality, stable income can only be achieved by 
water enterprise’s effort level. 
If the water authority is risk-averse, and the water enterprise is risk-neutral, then the water authority 
offers a lower water price and compensatory price to water enterprise, thus the water authority can secure a 
stable income and make the water enterprise assume most of  the residual claim and market risks. 
If both water authority and water enterprise are risk-neutral, then put  0 gm rr   into the formula, it’s easy to 
work out the balanced water plan in the case of risk-neutral and to obtain the balanced water price under the 
compensatory price level, the balanced expected revenues of water authority and water enterprise. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Since the water mamagement authority and water enterprise belong to different types of organizations, 
if  the  effective  coordination  mechanism  is  insufficient,  there  will  be  some  inevitable  conflicts  of  interest 
between the water authority and water enterprise, which will lead to the decline of social welfare in water 
industry. According to the results of this paper, the water authority can determine a reasonable water price and 
compensatory price by taking a comprehensive consideration of water fee and market price, as well as its own 
risk preference and water enterprise’s. Cooperating with the water enterprise, the water authority can realize the 
overall profit maximization of water supply industry and achieve the ideal win-win situation. If the information 
is asymmetrical and the water enterprise is risk-averse, the simple compensation policy will lose collaborative 
effect. Therefore, using the compensation policy model with risk preference, we can have a reasonable analysis 
about  decision-making  behaviors  of  water  authority  and  market  behaviors  of  water  enterprise,  in  order  to 
provide a practical and feasible theoretical tool for decision-makers, especially for those who are in the Chinese 
water industry, to select and formulate the compensation policies scientifically and achieve the social Pareto 
Optimality in the water industry. 
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